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Article: 
Suppose someone were to say to you, "Look, I grant that moral responsibility requires freedom and that 
freedom requires alternate possibilities. Nonetheless, it's perfectly possible for someone to be morally 
responsible even in the absence of alternate possibilities." You would be mystified. You would, in G. E. 
Moore's
1
 gentle phrase, "be entitled to laugh at him and to distrust his future statements" about moral 
responsibility (ibid., p. 13). So, too, if he were to say, "I grant that moral responsibility requires freedom and 
that freedom is incompatible with causal determinism. Still, it's perfectly possible for someone to be morally 
responsible even if determinism is true." 
 
Well, I do not want you to laugh at me or to distrust my future statements about moral responsibility, and so I 
shall not ask you to accept either of the foregoing positions. But I shall be urging you to accept something very 
close to them. As a corollary, I shall also be urging you to rethink your stand on several of our current practices, 
including especially the practice of punishment. 
 
Let me begin by distinguishing judgments about moral responsibility from two other types of judgments with 
which they are apt to be confused. 
 
I 
First, judgments about moral responsibility are distinct from judgments about moral right, wrong, and 
obligation. Judgments of the latter sort are frequently called deontic. There is no standard term to refer to 
judgments about moral responsibility, and so let me coin one: hypological.
2
 Hypological judgments have 
(primarily) to do with the moral praiseworthiness (or laudability) and blameworthiness (or culpability) of 
persons; they constitute one type of agent evaluation. Deontic judgments are quite different. It is common to say 
that deontic judgments constitute a type of act evaluation, but I am not sure that this is correct. We do 
admittedly say things like "What Joe did was right (wrong, obligatory)," and this seems to constitute an 
evaluation of Joe's act. But we also say things like "Joe was right (wrong, obligated) to do what he did," and this 
seems to constitute an evaluation of Joe. But, even if in the end we should declare deontic judgments a species 
of agent evaluation, they are quite different from hypological judgments. It is a commonplace that one can do 
right (or wrong) without being praiseworthy (or blameworthy). It is less commonly recognized, but nonetheless 
true (I believe
3
), that one can be praiseworthy (or blameworthy) without doing right (or wrong). 
 
Second, judgments about moral responsibility are distinct from judgments about moral virtue and vice. 
Judgments of the latter sort—often called aretaic—constitute a type of character evaluation. The relationship 
between persons and their characters is admittedly complex, and I do not propose to investigate the matter here. 
But, despite the fact that we often say things like "Joe is quite a character," I think it is pretty clear that persons 
should not be said to be characters so much as to have characters. Again, though, even if in the end we should 
declare aretaic judgments a species of agent evaluation, they are quite different from hypological judgments. It 
is a commonplace that one can have a certain character trait that has no bearing on one's moral responsibility. It 
is less commonly recognized, but nonetheless true (I believe
4
), that one can be morally responsible for 
something in a way that has no bearing on one's character. 
Even among those who agree that hypological judgments are distinct from both deontic and aretaic judgments, 
there is, however, disagreement about just what such judgments are judgments of. There are two closely related 
views on this which I shall mention here. The first is that to be morally responsible just is to be the appropriate 
object of one or more of what P. F. Strawson5 calls the "reactive attitudes," such as resentment, gratitude, 
forgiveness, and the like. This view has recently garnered considerable support.
6
 The second view is that to be 
morally responsible is to be such that there is an "entry" in one's "moral ledger" in light of some fact about 
oneself; one's "moral record as a person" is affected by this fact.
7
 (In putting matters this way, I do not mean to 
presuppose either that it is or that it is not possible to arrive at an overall assessment of one's moral worth by 
somehow aggregating the individual entries in one's ledger.) This is to put the second view only roughly, for a 
person may have a number of moral ledgers or records; but it can be made more precise by allying it to some 
degree with the first view. The moral record at issue is precisely that which renders the person the appropriate 
object of reactive attitudes (and, moreover, liable to more robust reactive measures, such as reward and 
punishment, that incorporate but extend beyond such attitudes). The difference between the first and second 
views is that, whereas the former identifies responsibility with susceptibility to certain reactive attitudes, the 
latter identifies responsibility with that in virtue of which one is susceptible to such attitudes. On the first view, 
the claim that responsibility is the proper occasion for certain reactive attitudes is analytic; on the second view, 




Although nothing will turn on this here, it is the second view to which I subscribe and in terms of which I shall 
couch my thesis. When I say that a person is praiseworthy, I shall mean that her moral record is favorably 
affected by some fact about herself; when I say that a person is blameworthy, I shall mean that her moral record 
is adversely affected by some such fact. To praise or blame someone, in this sense, is simply to make a 
judgment about her moral record, a judgment which may form the basis of, but which is not itself, a "reaction" 
either in attitude or in some more robust form of behavior toward that person. 
 
It is standardly acknowledged that there are two key components of moral responsibility, one epistemic and the 
other metaphysical. Here, I shall concentrate on the latter, which has to do with the freedom or control that the 
agent enjoys.
9
 Almost all writers on the subject have assumed that moral responsibility presupposes some form 
of freedom or control. There have of course been exceptions. Robert Merrihew Adams,
10
 for example, has 
argued that we are responsible for our sins, whether or not they are voluntary. The graduate of the Hitler 
Jugend, he says, is to be blamed for his beliefs and actions, regardless of whether they are in his control (ibid., 
p. 19). Similarly, Eugene Schlossberger
11
 has claimed that moral responsibility is simply a matter of moral 
evaluability, and there is no requirement that the agent enjoy any measure of control over that for which he is 
evaluable. One may be properly morally evaluated, Schlossberger says, in light of not just one's actions but also 
one's beliefs, emotions, and so on, irrespective of whether one is in control of them (ibid., pp. 6ff., 37ff., 101ff.). 
Thomas Scanlon
12
 contends that one is morally responsible for having certain attributes, even if one was not in 
control of coming to possess them, so long as it is appropriate to ask that one defend or disown them (ibid., pp. 
274ff.). And others
13
 have made similar claims. 
 
If the view of Adams and others were correct, then the perennial philosophical preoccupation with the relation 
between freedom and causal determinism would be badly misguided, insofar as it is driven (as it very often is) 
by a concern with coming to terms with moral responsibility. But I do not think that it is correct. Adams and 
others are, I believe, quite right to say that not all moral evaluations of or concerning an agent presuppose that 
the agent is in control of that in light of which the evaluations are made. It is surely correct to say that there can 
be, as Michael Slote
14
 puts it, ethics without free will. Much of virtue ethics, I would say, has nothing whatever 
to do with freedom or control. But that, of course, does not mean that the sort of moral evaluation that has to do 
with moral responsibility in particular has nothing to do with freedom or control. For example, while we may 
justifiably condemn evil wherever we find it, the fact is that it comes in various forms. In a recent, interesting 
discussion of moral evil, Daniel M. Haybron
15
 contrasts the sort of evil embodied by Claggart, the master-at-
arms in Herman Melville's Billy Budd, with the sort of evil embodied by Dorian Gray in Oscar Wilde's story. 
He puts the matter well: 
 
The purely evil individual [such as Claggart] is unquestionably vile, but he lacks an important fault: he 
does not give himself freely to evil, but is delivered to it. Claggart could not help but be a cruel man—
that's just the way he is. Dorian Gray's cruelty, on the other hand, is entirely of his own making (ibid., p. 
143). 
 
On the assumption that Haybron's observation is accurate, Claggart, though clearly morally evaluable in light of 
his particular brand of cruelty, is not, I would say, morally responsible for it, whereas this cannot be said of 
Dorian Gray regarding the cruelty that characterizes him. 
 
There are complications, of course. We should distinguish between having dispositions and acting on them, and 
so too between having control over and being morally responsible for one's dispositions and having control over 
and being morally responsible for acting on them. Still, at this point, let me just say that I side with the majority 
who declare freedom or control essential to moral responsibility.
16
 Thus the relation between freedom and 
causal determinism is for me a live issue. What I want to argue here is that a great deal of recent discussion, 
enlightening though much of it has been, has missed what is crucial about the connection between freedom and 
responsibility. Once what is crucial has been correctly identified, something strange happens: the connection 
itself becomes quite tenuous. This, in turn, threatens to undermine many of our common practices—in particu-
lar, the practice of punishment. 
 
II 
The great bulk of recent discussion of the connection between freedom and moral responsibility has focused on 
the issue of whether the control required by moral responsibility itself requires that the agent have the option to 
choose or act in a manner distinct from that in which he does choose and act—the issue, that is, of whether 
moral responsibility is possible in the absence of alternate possibilities. Harry G. Frankfurt"' has famously 
argued that moral responsibility does not require alternate possibilities. If correct, this is obviously important, 
inasmuch as the traditional incompatibilist position is one according to which moral responsibility is 
incompatible with causal determinism precisely because such responsibility requires alternate possibilities and 
alternate possibilities are incompatible with causal determinism. There are several
18
 who have rejected 
Frankfurt's argument, and their voice has grown increasingly strong in recent years. There are also several
19
 
who have accepted it. The discussion has been complex and subtle, and I believe much progress has been made. 
Nonetheless, all parties to the debate have tended to overlook what is crucial to the relation between freedom 
and moral responsibility. 
 
Why is freedom commonly regarded as important to moral responsibility? The usual answer is simply that we 
cannot be morally responsible for what is not in our contro1.
20
 I believe that this answer is accurate but 
incomplete. There is a more general point to be made, and that is that the degree to which we are morally 
responsible cannot be affected by what is not in our control. Put more pithily: luck is irrelevant to moral 
responsibility.
21
 This is the crucial point at issue. Pursuit of it will show that the question whether freedom 
requires alternate possibilities, and even the question whether freedom is compatible with causal determinism, 
paradoxically become considerably less significant than they are frequently taken to be. 
 
The relevance of luck to moral responsibility has been widely debated ever since the publication of the 
influential pair of papers on moral luck written by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nage1.
22
 But seldom have the 
implications of the denial of the relevance of luck to moral responsibility been pursued to their logical 
conclusion. It is this that I shall undertake here. We can distinguish between two broad types of luck, which I 
shall call resultant and situational.
23
 The former consists in luck with respect to the results of one's choices and 
actions; the latter consists in luck with respect to the situations in which one finds oneself. It is the former that is 
most often discussed, but it is the latter whose implications run deepest and are, as we shall see, especially 
subversive of our everyday judgments about moral responsibility. 
 
III 
We are all familiar with resultant luck. Examples of it abound in the literature. Here is one. "How is it possible," 
Nagel writes, "to be more or less culpable depending on whether...a bird [gets] into the path of one's bullet" (op. 
cit., p. 143)? My answer is that this is not possible. Let us compare cases. Suppose that George shot at Henry 
and killed him. Suppose that Georg shot at Henrik in circumstances which were, to the extent possible, exactly 
like those of George (by which I mean to include what went on "inside" the protagonists' heads as well as what 
happened in the "outside" world), except for the fact that Georg's bullet was intercepted by a passing bird (a 
rather large and solid bird) and Henrik escaped injury. Inasmuch as the bird's flight was not in Georg's control, 
the thesis that luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility implies that George and Georg are equally morally 
responsible. This, I believe, is absolutely correct. 
 
You may have some doubts. "If George and Georg are equally responsible," you may say, "then, since Georg is 
not responsible for killing Henrik—the bird luckily got in the way (or unluckily, depending on whose 
perspective is at issue: Henrik's, Georg's, or the bird's)—it follows that George is not responsible for killing 
Henry. But that's absurd. If that were the case, no one would ever be responsible for killing anyone, since 
success in one's endeavors always requires the cooperation of factors that are beyond one's control." 
 
This objection is based on a misunderstanding. I do not wish to deny that George is responsible for killing 
Henry (or for Henry's death—the distinction between actions and their "results"
24
 seems to me irrelevant here); 
whether he is so will depend on details of the case (both epistemic and metaphysical) which I have not supplied. 
And, of course, I concede that Georg is not responsible for killing Henrik (or for Henrik's death), since Henrik 
did not die. Thus I am quite willing to grant that George may well be responsible for more things than Georg. 
What I deny is that George is any mare responsible than Georg. We must distinguish the degree of someone's 
responsibility from its scope. (The term 'extent' strikes me as ambiguous between the two.) My claim is that 
George and Georg bear responsibility to the same degree, despite the fact that George's responsibility has 
greater scope. Let us suppose that George committed murder when he killed Henry and is indeed to blame for 
doing so. (This requires that George satisfy both some epistemic condition and some condition concerning 
freedom or control. There is no need for me to specify these conditions further; I invite you to fill in the details 
as you deem fit.) On the view of responsibility adumbrated earlier, this means that George's moral record as a 
person is adversely affected in some way in virtue of the fact that he killed Henry as he did. My claim is that, 
although Henrik survived Georg's attempt to kill him, Georg's moral record as a person is adversely affected in 
precisely the same way. 
 
"But what," you may ask, "is Georg supposed to be responsible for? In virtue of what is his moral record 
supposed to be adversely affected?" The answer is simple: he is responsible for his attempt on Henrik's life, just 
as George is responsible for his attempt on Henry's life. The fact that Georg's attempt was unsuccessful, 
whereas George's was successful, is irrelevant to the question of how blameworthy they are. 
 
"But that is to trivialize Henry's death," you may protest. No, it is not. Clearly, something terrible happened 
when George killed Henry, something that has no counterpart in the case of Georg and Henrik. It may even be 
agreed that George did something morally wrong that Georg did not. But that is a deontic judgment.
25
 My claim 
is simply that, when it comes to judgments about responsibility, more particularly to judgments about degree of 
responsibility, George and Georg are on a par. It is especially important to note that this claim affords Georg no 
excuse whatsoever. I have said that George is no more to blame than Georg, and that may seem to suggest that 
George is not particularly blameworthy. But, of course, there is no such implication. I could equally well have 
said that Georg is no less to blame than George; the passing bird in no way mitigates Georg's blameworthiness. 
 
You may still be uneasy. "Wouldn't it be appropriate," you may ask, "to react more harshly toward George than 
toward Georg—for instance, to punish him more severely? Doesn't this show that George is more blameworthy 
than Georg after all?" This is a difficult matter. I have agreed that responsibility is directly correlated, even if it 
is not identical, with susceptibility to reactive attitudes (and to more robust reactive measures). Given this, it 
might seem that I am committed to denying that it is appropriate to react more harshly toward George than 
toward Georg. And in one sense I am. I am committed to denying that George deserves (in virtue of his moral 
record) a harsher reaction than Georg. But that leaves open the possibility that it would be morally justified to 
react more harshly toward George than toward Georg for reasons other than those having to do with desert (or, 
more precisely, desert rooted in George's moral record). Perhaps there are good moral reasons to punish murder, 
such as that committed by George, more severely than a failed attempt at murder, such as that committed by 





I believe that anyone who takes seriously the view that we cannot be morally responsible for that which is not in 
our control must acknowledge that George and Georg are equally responsible and thus accept the more general 
claim that luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility. I recognize that there is a clear sense in which George was 
in control of Henry's death; he was (we may assume) in control of whether he shot at Henry in the way that he 
did, and, under the circumstances, shooting at Henry in that way was all that was needed to kill him. He shot at 
Henry, and Henry consequently died; had he not shot at Henry, Henry would not have died. Nonetheless, it is 
also true that George controlled Henry's death only to the extent that he controlled his shooting at Henry; the 
other factors that conspired to produce Henry's death were not in his control at all. In this respect, George was 
no more in control of what happened to Henry than Georg was in control of what happened to Henrik.
27
 Just as 
with responsibility, so too with control: we must distinguish degree from scope. George was in control of more 
things than Georg (his control had greater scope), but he was no more in control of what happened than Georg 
was (he was in control to the same degree). Insofar as degree of responsibility tracks degree of control, George 
and Georg must be declared equally morally responsible. 
 
Although what I have said about equality of desert already casts some doubt on our current practice of 
punishment, there is nothing in what I have said so far that impugns the significance of the questions whether 
freedom requires alternate possibilities and whether freedom is compatible with causal determinism. If George 
and Georg are morally responsible for their respective attempts at murder, this is (in part) because they freely 
committed these attempts. Whether such freedom requires that they could have acted differently seems an 
important question. Whether such freedom requires causal indeterminism likewise seems an important question. 
The thesis that resultant luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility does nothing to reduce the urgency of these 
questions. 
 
But the thesis that situational luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility is a different matter. Once again, this is a 
type of luck with which we are all familiar. But few
28
 appear to take it seriously, perhaps because doing so is 
disturbingly humbling. "There but for the grace of God go I," we may mutter on occasion, but then we quickly 
turn away from such a discomfiting thought. 
 
There are two basic varieties of luck regarding the situations in which one finds oneself: the first having to do 
with one's circumstances, the second with one's constitution. I shall discuss each in turn. 
 
Return to George and Henry and their counterparts, Georg and Henrik. Suppose, as before, that George shot at 
Henry and killed him. Suppose also, as before, that Georg did not kill Henrik; suppose now, however, that this 
was not because he took a shot that was intercepted by some unfortunate bird, but rather because he took no 
shot at all. And suppose that this was because of something quite fortuitous: Georg sneezed just as he was about 
to shoot, for example; or a truck pulled up in front of Henrik, blocking Georg's line of fire; or Henrik turned 
suddenly into a doorway, just as Georg was about to squeeze the trigger. Whereas in the case involving the bird, 
luck intervened after the shot took place, thereby preventing Henrik's death, in this sort of case the intervention 
occurs earlier, before Georg has a chance to act at all. But the cases are united in that, in all of them, Georg 
would have freely killed Henrik but for some feature of the case over which he had no control. This being so, it 
seems that we must conclude here, as before, that Georg is as culpable as George. The circumstances that 
conspired to save Henrik afford Georg no excuse. 
 
Again, you may have some doubts. "Excuse for what?" you may ask. "What is Georg supposed to be 
responsible for this time? In this sort of case, there isn't even an attempt on Henrik's life that you can pin on 
Georg." One answer to this question is simply to say that what Georg is responsible for is his being such that he 
would have freely killed Henrik, given the opportunity. But actually I find this quite dubious. I have said that I 
subscribe to the view that we cannot be responsible for what is not in our control, and I doubt it should be said 
that Georg was in control of his being such that he would have freely killed Henrik.
29
 In my view (which I shall 
not try to defend here), an agent exercises control directly over his choices (that is, his choosings) and indirectly 
over the consequences of his choices. In the sort of case under discussion, Georg's being such that he would 
have freely killed Henrik is clearly not itself a choice of his; nor is it the consequence of a choice of his. Rather, 
he would have freely killed Henrik because he would have freely chosen to shoot him, had he had the 
cooperation of certain features of the case; and this is a choice which did not occur, precisely because the 
requisite cooperation was not forthcoming. 
 
I think, therefore, that we should reject the claim that Georg is responsible for being such that he would have 
freely killed Henrik. And I think that there is nothing else for which Georg might be said to be responsible.
30
 If 
so, this sort of case serves to emphasize, in even more dramatic fashion than before, the distinction between 
degree and scope of responsibility. The degree of Georg's responsibility remains the same as George's, but the 
scope of Georg's responsibility has dwindled to nothing. Georg is responsible; he is just not responsible for 
anything. He is, as I shall put it, "responsible tout court." Lest this appear unduly paradoxical, let me hasten to 
add that it is nonetheless the case that Georg is responsible in virtue of something, and this something just is his 
being such that he would have freely killed Henrik, had he had the cooperation of certain features of the case.
31
 
All responsibility, including responsibility tout court, is fundamentally relational. It is precisely because George 
is responsible in virtue of the very same sort of fact (the fact that he would have freely killed someone, had he 
had the cooperation—as he did—of certain features of the case) in virtue of which Georg is responsible, that 
George and Georg are responsible to the same degree. 
 
Let me turn now from circumstantial to constitutive luck,
32
 from luck having to do with one's external situation 
to luck having to do with one's internal situation. Suppose, for instance, that the reason why Georg did not kill 
Henrik was that he was too timid, or that he had a thick skin and Henrik's insults did not upset him in the way 
that Henry's insults upset George, or that he was deaf and simply did not hear the insults that Henrik hurled his 
way. If it is nonetheless true that Georg would have freely shot and killed Henrik but for some such feature of 





If what I have just said is true, then I believe the question whether freedom requires alternate possibilities loses 
a good deal of its significance. This is because even those who deny that freedom requires alternate possibilities 
will, of course, agree that freedom does not require the absence of alternate possibilities. So let us suppose that, 
when George freely killed Henry, he had the option not to do so. Given that he satisfied whatever epistemic 
requirement must be met in order to be responsible, everyone will agree that George is responsible for killing 
Henry.
34
 What should we say if we were now to suppose that George lacked the option not to kill Henry, due to 
some Frankfurtian constraint? Some would say that George freely killed Henry anyway; others would say that, 
if the constraint really did deprive George of any (relevant) alternate possibility, then he did not freely kill 
Henry after all. Given the assumption that moral responsibility requires freedom, many have understandably 
thought that it is therefore very important to determine whether the agent does act freely in such a case. But, as I 
see it, this concern is considerably diluted, if it is agreed that George would have freely killed Henry in the 
absence of the Frankfurtian constraint. For we should then conclude that, regardless of whether he did freely kill 
Henry, George is in fact just as responsible as he would have been had he freely killed Henry. 
 
Indeed, in light of this, even the supposedly fundamental question whether freedom is compatible with causal 
determinism loses much of its force. (It may retain more of its force than the question regarding alternate 
possibilities, however, insofar as some of those who deny that freedom requires indeterminism do claim that it 
requires determinism.
35
) Consider a case of luck that has to do with what may be called antecedent 
circumstances.
36
 Suppose that Georg had been subjected to some Clockwork Orange-type conditioning process 
that rendered him incapable of killing. (This would seem to count as a case of constitutive as well as 
circumstantial luck.) If it is nonetheless true that he would have freely killed Henrik, but for this conditioning 
process over which he had no control, then he is just as responsible as George. Suppose, now, that Georg was 
not conditioned not to kill Henrik but simply that he was deterministically caused not to (the chain of causation 
extending back before Georg's birth, if you wish). Incompatibilists would claim that his not killing Henrik was 
therefore unfree, whereas compatibilists would deny this. But, as I see it, the significance of this dispute is 
considerably reduced by the observation that, even if the incompatibilist is right, Georg is still as responsible as 
George, if he would have freely killed Henrik, had his causal history cooperated.
37
 My conclusion is that it is 
perfectly possible for someone to be morally responsible, even if causal determinism is true and even if freedom 
is incompatible with such determinism. To put it bluntly, it does not matter whether Georg could have killed 
Henrik. What matters is whether he would have freely killed him, if he had the cooperation of certain features 
of the case. And I say this even though I take freedom to be crucial to judgments of moral responsibility. 
 
To get clear on just what my proposal is, let us return for a moment to the two positions mentioned at the outset. 
They can be laid out formally as follows: 
 
(A) (1) Moral responsibility requires freedom. 
(2) Freedom requires alternate possibilities. 
(3) Moral responsibility does not require alternate possibilities. 
 
(B) (1) Moral responsibility requires freedom. 
(2) Freedom requires causal indeterminism. 
(3) Moral responsibility does not require causal indeterminism. 
 
In each case, we have an inconsistent triad. To resolve the inconsistency, what I have proposed is this. First, I 
have conceded that one cannot be morally responsible for something unless that thing is or was in one's control, 
and so in this sense clause (1) of (A) and (B) must be granted.
38
 If clause (2) should also be granted (a matter 
about which I have been noncommittal; note that it is possible that clause (2) should be granted in one case but 
not the other), then of course clause (3) must be rejected. But I have argued, further, that one can be morally 
responsible tout court, that is, responsible without being responsible for something, and that, on this 
understanding, clause (1) of (A) and (B) should be rejected. Thus, even if clause (2) should in each case be 
granted, clause (3) may (and, I believe, should) also be accepted. That is precisely what reduces the significance 
of the question whether clause (2) is true. 
 
At this point I should say something to forestall certain possible misunderstandings. 
 
First, do not be misled by what I have just said into thinking that I am invoking two types of moral 
responsibility here. On the contrary, there is just one type. George and Georg are to be morally evaluated in 
exactly the same way, even though George is responsible for something that Georg is not. They are equally 
responsible; if George is deserving of a particular reaction, then Georg is deserving of the very same reaction. 
This indicates that whether there is something for which one is responsible is immaterial; all that matters, 
fundamentally, is whether one is responsible. Degree of responsibility counts for everything, scope for nothing, 
when it comes to such moral evaluation of agents. Thus my concession just now that clause (3) of (A) and (B) 
may have to be rejected, if one's concern is with the possibility of one's being responsible for something, is of 
small moment. What matters, at bottom, is that clause (3) may and, I believe, should be accepted, if one's 




Second, do not be misled by my claim that clause (1) of (A) and (B) is to be rejected (given that one's concern is 
with responsibility tout court) into thinking that I am reverting to the position of Adams and others mentioned 
above, to the effect that freedom is irrelevant to moral responsibility. On the contrary, I want to insist that it is 
pivotal, in that the degree to which we are morally responsible cannot be affected by what is not in our control. 
It is this crucial fact which renders luck, not freedom, irrelevant to responsibility. Granted, my view implies that 
Claggart might after all be as responsible as Dorian Gray; this would be true if Claggart would have freely 
given himself to evil, as Gray did, had he had the opportunity to do so. In saying this, however, I am not 
collapsing the distinction between aretaic judgments and hypological judgments upon which I insisted earlier. 
That distinction remains. I am saying that, in addition to the sort of aretaic judgment that is appropriate to 
Claggart (but not to Gray) in light of his particular type of moral depravity, it may be that a certain judgment 




In saying this, I am invoking the view (which I attributed above to Slote, and with which Haybron clearly 
concurs in his discussion of Claggart) that some types of moral judgments, in particular certain judgments about 
moral virtue and vice, do not presuppose that we enjoy freedom of will. A sadist is evil, I would say, even if he 
cannot control either having or acting on his sadistic impulses. Naturally, this may be resisted. Such a person, it 
might be objected, is no more evil than a "vicious" dog (the quotation marks constituting an acknowledgment 
that a dog, of course, cannot really have a vice, let alone a moral one), precisely because he shares the inability 
to control his viciousness. But while we should surely agree that a vicious dog is not evil, there are possible 
explanations of this which do not appeal to its lack of control over its having or acting on its vicious impulses. 
One explanation is that a dog is not the sort of creature that typically has such control, whereas a sadist is. 
Perhaps this has some merit, but to my mind a better explanation is that a dog lacks the capacity to reflect on its 
behavior in moral (or morally relevant) terms, whereas a sadist typically does not. 
 
Suppose I am wrong about this. Suppose that luck is as irrelevant to aretaic as to hypological judgments. 
Suppose, further, that nothing else serves to distinguish judgments about virtue and vice from judgments about 
responsibility tout court.
41
 In this case, my argument implies that hypological judgments do after all collapse 
into aretaic judgments. Although I reject this conclusion, it would still be significant, relying as it does on the 
central idea that, when it comes to judgments about moral responsibility, it is at bottom only responsibility tout 
court that matters; judgments about responsibility far something are essentially otiose. 
 
A final possible source of misunderstanding is my use of the term `responsibility tout court'. It is intended to 
drive home the idea that we can be responsible without being responsible for anything. But, as I said earlier, it is 
not intended to suggest that responsibility can be nonrelational. In every case, Georg is responsible in virtue of 
some fact—the very same kind of fact in virtue of which George is responsible—even if in some of these cases 
(the ones involving situational luck) George is responsible for something while Georg is not. Nor should the 
term 'responsibility tout court' be thought to suggest that there is just one way in which an agent is responsible 
on any given occasion. On the contrary, since an indefinite number of counterfactuals about what one would do, 
if one were differently situated, can be true at once, one can be morally responsible tout court—both positively 
and negatively—to an indefinite number of degrees at once.
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 The view that I propose thus opens up the 
floodgates, as it were, when it comes to ascriptions of responsibility—of laudability as well as culpability.
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 The 
consequent profusion of ascriptions has profound practical implications, as I shall now briefly explain. 
 
If, as I have urged, the truth of hypological judgments turns not just on what we actually freely do but, more 
deeply, on what we would counterfactually freely do, then the differences between individuals regarding the 
hypological judgments that are appropriate to them threaten to dissolve. (To what extent differences may still 
remain can only be a matter of speculation, depending on a number of issues that cannot be broached here.) For 
example, it may well be that not only Georg but most or even all of us would have freely acted as George did, 
were it not for some feature of our situation over which we lacked control. If so, we are, in virtue of this fact, 
deserving of the same reaction as George; if he deserves punishment, then so do we. By the same token, if 
George would have freely led the same sort of upright life as the lives that you and I lead, were it not for some 
feature of his situation over which he lacked control, then he is deserving of the same reaction as we; if we 
deserve to be rewarded (or at least not to be punished), then so does he. This casts considerable doubt on the 
propriety of our current practices, especially the practice of punishment. My point is not that no one can be 
culpable or deserving of punishment. Rather, it is that those whom we actually punish are likely to be no more 
deserving of punishment than many of those whom we do not punish and also likely to be as deserving of 
reward (or at least of nonpunishment) as many of those whom we reward (or refrain from punishing). Insofar as 
our current practices are based on judgments about what people deserve in light of the responsibility they bear, 
they radically distort the truth and are deeply discriminatory. 
 
VI 
My argument here depends crucially on the claim that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, had certain 
features of the case cooperated. There are several reasons that may be given for denying this claim and, hence, 
for rejecting the argument. 
 
One reason is this: we are never justified in making such a claim, at least when the antecedent is not satisfied. 
Even if it is true that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, if certain features of the case had cooperated, we 
cannot know this if such cooperation was, in fact, not forthcoming. 
 
In response, let me grant that it is often likely to be true that we do not and cannot know such a thing, but I do 
not see why it should always be true. Suppose that Georg, stung by Henrik's insults, had plotted long and hard 
for revenge, that he had repeatedly voiced his desire to see Henrik dead, that the day had come to put his plan 
into action, that he had positioned himself in the appropriate place at the appropriate time, that he had raised his 
gun and was on the brink of shooting point-blank at an unprotected Henrik—and that he was interrupted by a 
sneeze at the crucial moment. And suppose that I was at his side every step of the way, witnessing all that took 
place. Under such conditions, I think I would be justified in claiming that Georg would have freely killed 
Henrik, had he not sneezed when he did. But even if I am mistaken about this, my thesis here is unaffected; for 
this thesis depends, not on our knowing whether counterfactuals of this sort are true, but simply on their being 
true. 
 
A second reason for doubting my thesis is this: such counterfactuals are never known to be true precisely 
because they never are true. But why think this? One answer would simply be that counterfactuals generally 
have no truth value. I shall not try to respond to this; I simply assume here that certain counterfactuals are true 
and that some account of them, perhaps along something like the well-known lines supplied by David Lewis," is 
correct. Another answer is that, even though counterfactuals do generally have a truth value, counterfactuals of 
the sort at issue here, that have to do with free action in particular, are never true. Let me say something briefly 
about this. 
 
It must be granted that it is possible that the sort of counterfactuals that are at issue here are never true. For 
example, even if we must accept the truth of the claim that, if certain features of the case had cooperated, it 
would have been the case that Georg either did or did not freely kill Henrik, it remains perfectly possible that it 
is not true either that, if there had been such cooperation, it would have been the case that Georg did freely kill 
Henrik, or that, if there had been such cooperation, it would have been the case that Georg did not freely kill 
Henrik (ibid., pp. 16ff.). Perhaps this sort of thing sometimes happens; if it does, it will of course block the 
ascription of responsibility tout court to the agent. But although this may happen on occasion, why think that it 
is always actually the case? 
 
It has been argued that, in fact, this must always be the case, if freedom is, as the libertarian conceives of it, 
incompatible with causal determinism. This argument is usually given in the context of a discussion whether 
divine foreknowledge is compatible with such freedom. Alvin Plantinga
45
 has asserted that counterfactuals 
concerning such freedom can be, and often are, true (ibid., pp. 173ff.). Adams and others
46
 have argued to the 
contrary, on the grounds that counterfactuals require a necessary connection between antecedent and 
consequent, and that this conflicts with the libertarian view that freedom requires the absence of any such 
necessitation. This is a difficult matter which I cannot try to resolve here. Let me simply note the following. 
First, if freedom is compatible with causal determinism, then, even if Adams and others are correct, the 
argument that Georg is as responsible as George in all the various scenarios we have discussed is entirely 
unaffected. Second, if freedom is incompatible with causal determinism, then, even if Adams and others are 
correct (which is disputable), the argument, though admittedly affected, is not undercut nearly as drastically as 
it might at first appear. This is because, as Adams and others are ready to agree, even if it must be false that 
Georg would have freely killed Henrik, had he had the cooperation of certain features of the case which was, in 
fact, not forthcoming, it can nonetheless be true that Georg would probably have freely killed Henrik, had such 
cooperation been forthcoming, for as high a degree of probability as you like (short of certainty).
47
 This may not 
satisfy the defender of the view that divine foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom, insofar as 
God is supposed to be essentially infallible, but it suffices to show that Georg's blamelessness is by no means 
guaranteed. Suppose that there is a probability of .99 that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, had he not 
sneezed. Then one of two things follows: either Georg is 99% as responsible as George, or there is a 99% 
chance that Georg is as responsible as George. It is not clear to me which we should say, although I lean toward 
the latter.
48
 In either case, Georg clearly cannot count on having a clean moral record just because he sneezed. 
 
Of course, if Adams and others are right, then the question whether freedom is compatible with determinism 
recovers some of the significance that has traditionally been accorded to it. But if I am right that Georg is 
nonetheless probably as responsible as, or nearly as responsible as, George, this question certainly does not 
recover all of its significance. 
 
A point related to the last one is this. Even if Adams and others are not right, might it not be that the truth of the 
claim that Georg would have freely killed Henrik depends on whether freedom is compatible with causal 
determinism? If so, would this not restore the significance of the question whether compatibilism is true? 
 
This is a difficult matter. In principle, I do not see why there should not be considerable convergence between 
the judgments of compatibilists and incompatibilists regarding whether some agent would have freely done so-
and-so under such-and-such circumstances.
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 To the extent that this is so, the question whether freedom is 
compatible with determinism is moot. To the extent that this is not so, however, I concede that the significance 
of this question is restored. But, even then, there is a strict limit to the restoration. As long as an incompatibilist 
is prepared to agree that some agent would, or would probably, have freely acted in some way in which he was 
caused not to act, and that this fact grounds the ascription of responsibility tout court to the agent, the question 
whether freedom is compatible with determinism simply does not recover all of the significance that has 
traditionally been accorded to it. 
 
A final reason to be skeptical of the claim that Georg would have freely killed Henrik, had certain features of 
the case cooperated, has to do with those cases that concern constitutive luck in particular. It has been suggested 
that such luck is incoherent, inasmuch as it presupposes that one could have been a different person.
50
 I deny 
this. What it presupposes is that one could have had different personal characteristics, and surely this is 
sometimes true. If Georg failed to kill Henrik simply because he was deaf (literally) to Henrik's insults, it seems 
clearly intelligible to say that he would, or would probably, have freely killed Henrik had he not been deaf. But 
what of other characteristics, such as being timid or thick skinned? Can we intelligibly say that Georg would 
have freely killed Henrik had he not had such characteristics as these? That depends on whether such 
characteristics are essential to Georg. I am inclined to think that they are not, but this is another difficult matter 
that I shall not try to resolve here.
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 Let me simply note that, if such characteristics are not essential to those 
who have them, then the truth of the relevant counterfactuals is unaffected. I concede, however, that, if any such 




This concession is important. It means that the role that luck plays in the determination of moral responsibility 
may not be entirely eliminable, even if it is to be neutralized to the extent that I have argued for here. That is 
because, regardless of just which personal characteristics should be said to be essential to persons, it is presum-
ably correct to say that some are. Consider any such characteristic that Georg may have. It is then necessarily 
false to say that Georg would have freely killed Henrik had he not had that characteristic. In such a case, Georg 
does get off the hook, even though he was, of course, not in control of whether he had the characteristic in ques-
tion.
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 (Or rather, my argument does not suffice to keep him on the hook. The general thesis that one cannot 
escape responsibility through luck should incline one to think that Georg can be responsible even in a case in 
which he fails to act freely due to some characteristic that is essential to him, since the possession of any such 
characteristic is a matter of luck.) But this concession is not enough to resurrect the significance traditionally 
accorded to the questions whether freedom requires alternate possibilities and whether freedom is compatible 
with causal determinism. I am prepared to agree that the capacity to act freely is essential to whatever has it. 
(Thus it must be false to say, for instance, that Georg's gun would have freely killed Henrik, had it had the 
capacity to do so.) But it is surely not correct to say that one's being such that one has (or lacks) alternate 
possibilities, or one's being such that causal determinism is (or is not) true, is a characteristic that one has 
essentially. This being the case, I conclude that the questions whether moral responsibility requires alternate 
possibilities and whether such responsibility requires causal indeterminism are not as important as they have 
traditionally been taken to be. I conclude, further, that many of our common practices, in particular the practice 
of punishment, are in dire need of revision. 
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